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RISKY BUSINESS: REJECTING ADHERENCE
TO INDUSTRY STANDARDS IN EXCLUSIVE
SONGWRITER AGREEMENTS
INTRODUCTION

Since before songwriters and piano players converged on Tin Pan
Alley1 to market their wares, songwriters' creative efforts have been
protected. The Founding Fathers saw the expediency in placing a

guarding hand over the creative labors of the citizens of the United
States through the Constitution.2 Further, the intellectual property of
composers, authors, artists, and inventors is protected by The Copy-

right Act of 1976.1 Unfortunately, these safeguards do not protect
creative persons from unconscionable contractual terms that have had
a long history and tradition in the music industry.'

Recent cases in both the United States and England have rejected
adherence to either custom and usage or industry practices in personal

services contracts used in a variety of entertainment industries.5 The

courts should follow the guidance of these decisions and apply the

doctrine of unconscionability to exclusive songwriter agreements to
find the unbargained for terms unconscionable.

Unconscionability is a relatively new contract theory.6 American
courts have been reluctant to utilize this theory to strike down uncon1. See H. WILEY HITCHCOCK, MUSIC IN THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION 187-88 (1969). During the early 1900s Tin Pan Alley, located in New
York City, was the center of popular music. See id.
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress has the power to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (Copyright Act of 1976). Eight
broad categories are protected under the Copyright Act. See id.
4. For one of the earliest cases dealing with unconscionable songwriter contracts,
see M. Witmark & Sons v. Peters, 149 N.Y.S. 642, 644 (N.Y. 1914), where the court
refused to enforce an exclusive songwriter agreement which was inequitable and disproportionate to the songwriter. See also infra Part I.A.
5. See generally DONALD E. BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES

§ 5.5 (3d ed. 1996) (surveying caselaw on both uncon-

scionable and adhesion contracts in the entertainment industries). See, e.g., Buchwald
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14482 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A.
County, Dec. 21, 1990) (Phase II) (vacated pursuant to settlement on appeal) (Buchwald II), reprinted in BIEDERMAN ET AL., § 5.5 at 451-52; O'Sullivan v. Management
Agency & Music Ltd., 3 All E.R. 351 (C.A. 1985); Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v.
WEA Records Ltd., 1 All E.R. 237 (C.A. 1975); A Schroeder Music Publ'g Co. v.
Macaulay, 3 All E.R. 616 (H.L. 1974).
6. The theory of unconscionability was introduced in the 1948 draft of U.C.C.
§ 2-302 and was adopted in 1952. Prior to the edition of the concept in the U.C.C. and
general use of the doctrine in contractual cases, equity courts applied similar concepts
to reach a just and right result. See discussion infra Part I.A.
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scionable terms of exclusive songwriter agreements.7 Adherence to
industry standards is not a sufficient reason to enforce unconscionable
terms of an exclusive songwriter agreement. The court would only
have to "re-write" the agreement once between the parties, and/or
strike down certain provisions, and the industry, as a whole, would
reform its practices. This reformation would provide an equal footing
between songwriters and publishers, while promoting an atmosphere
more conducive to creativity. Music publishing is a big business and
every participant in the industry bears a risk-winners and losers. In
1993 alone, music publishing revenues surpassed the $5 billion mark.8
And, although total revenues are high, they are spread disproportionetly in favor of those with the most bargaining power. Thus, the issue
of why courts should break from the industry norm and carve out a
new standard needs to be addressed in order to furnish the judiciary
with alternative modes of analysis to be used when examining the area
of unconscionability in personal services contracts.
Part I of this Comment addresses the formation of the doctrine of
unconscionability. Part I also covers the nature of exclusive songwriter agreements and how the doctrine of unconscionability can be
utilized to level the playing field between songwriters and music publishers. Part II analogizes other areas within the entertainment industry where the courts have rejected adherence to industry standards
and reformed the contractual agreements between the parties. This
section's primary focus will be the court's reasoning in Phase II of
Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp. (Buchwald II) 9 and how that
court's analysis can be applied to exclusive songwriter agreements.
Although Buchwald II is unpublished, the case is cited by commentators when addressing what they believe should be the appropriate
analysis regarding unconscionability in contracts. 10 The decision in
7. See Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 737 F.2d 229 (2d
Cir. 1984). But see M. Witmark & Sons v. Peters, 149 N.Y.S. 642 (N.Y. 1914). The
decision in M. Witmark & Sons was reached prior to the Uniform Commercial Code

adoption of unconscionability in 1952 or wide spread use of the doctrine at common
law.
8. See Irv Lichtman, PublishingRevenues Hit $5 Billion-1993 Total Is Up 6%,
Worldwide Survey Says, BILLBOARD, Sept. 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library.
9. 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14482 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Dec. 21, 1990)
(Phase II) (vacated pursuant to settlement on appeal). The trial court issued three
Statements of Decision. The First Phase, issued on January 8, 1990, concluded that
the movie was based on the idea of Buchwald, the plaintiff. The Second Phase, cited
above and issued on December 21, 1990, concluded that certain terms in the net profits participation agreement were unconscionable. The Third Phase, issued on March
16, 1992, decided the amount of damages due Bernheim and Buchwald on the reformed contract. All three decisions are reprinted as appendices in PIERCE
O'DONNELL & DENNIS McDOUGAL, FATAL SUBTRACTION:
ALLY DOES BUSINESS (1992).

How HOLLYWOOD RE-

10. See, e.g., BEIDERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 450; Theresa E. Van Beveren,
The Demise of the Long-Term PersonalServices Contractin the Music Industry: Artis-
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Buchwald II will be contrasted with decisions reached in other areas
of the entertainment industry in the United States and the cases that
have become known simply as the "English Music Trilogy."'" The

conclusion of this Comment will include both legal and policy arguments as to why adherence to current industry standards in exclusive
songwriter agreements is a disservice to both parties of the contract.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

History of Unconscionability

Unconscionability' 2 has been defined as "an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms
that are unreasonably favorable to the other party."'1 3 Some commentators believe that this theory is hard to reconcile with the bargain
principle that is grounded in the freedom to contract.' 4 As the use of
this doctrine becomes more frequent, it is evident that the courts are
reaching their own reconciliation between upholding the underlying
principles of contract
law and the evolving doctrine of
5
unconscionability.'
The doctrine has worked its way into the common law as a means to
alleviate unfairness of terms and overreaching by parties. 6 Initially,
the doctrine was utilized in courts of equity 7 and in courts of law
tic Freedom against Company Profit, 3 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 377, 417 (1996). But see
Harry G. Prince, Unconscionabilityin California: A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459 (1995) (disagreeing with the analysis used in Buchwald

ii).
11. See O'Sullivan v. Management Agency & Music Ltd., 3 All E.R. 351 (C.A.
1985); Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. WEA Records Ltd., 1 All E.R. 237 (C.A.
1975); A Schroeder Music Publ'g Co. v. Macaulay, 3 All E.R. 616 (H.L. 1974).
12. For a thorough discussion of the history of unconscionability and contrasting
views on analysis of the doctrine see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28 n.4
(2d ed. 1990). See also Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The
Bargain Principle and its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1982); Prince, supra note 10.
13. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
14. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 799 (working through the reconciliation process and reaching the conclusion that unconscionability "explains and justifies
the limits that should be placed upon the bargain principle").
15. See generally id. at 748-55 (discussing the principle of unconscionability and its
increased use by the courts that are looking at more than unfair surprise).
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a (1979). The comment to the Restatement states that
[i]f a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is
made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the
application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
Id.
17. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948) (disallowing equitable relief to the buyers of carrots when the agreement was so inequitable to the
sellers of carrots); M. Witmark & Sons v. Peters, 149 N.Y.S. 642, 644 (N.Y. 1914)
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under the disguise of some other theory of recovery.'" Today, the
doctrine has been codified in section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code.' 9 The purpose behind the 1948 initial draft of section 2-302
was to provide the courts with a way to strike terms they found unconscionable.20 Section 2-302 provides guidance and congruence 21 in the
application of the doctrine, even though the term unconscionability
has remained undefined in the code. 22 The test under section 2-302 is
similar to the one at common law.23 The court must decide, "in light

of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of
the particular trade or case, [whether] the clauses involved are so onesided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the

time of the making of the contract. ''24 Decisions made under this section serve as guidance for cases not governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.25

In 1967, in order to balance the concept of unconscionability with
the traditional principles of contracts, Professor Arthur A. Leff divided unconscionability in two categories-procedural and substantive.26 Procedural unconscionability refers to the "process of
contracting,, 27 while substantive unconscionability refers to the resulting outcome of the contract.2 8 Whether both elements need to be
present for a successful claim depends on the jurisdiction. 29 An adequate showing of each would present a stronger argument that the

agreement was unconscionable. Some courts will allow claims in

(refusing to enforce in equity a contract in which "the benefits accruing to the plaintiff
are so palpably disproportioned to the services required to be performed by [defendant, the breaching party] .
). See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, § 4.27; Prince,
supra note 10, at 467-69.
18. See Prince, supra note 10, at 467-69; FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, § 4.27.
19. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977) (providing no definition of unconscionability). See also
UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICE ACT § 4(c)(2),
DENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 1.303,

7A U.L.A. 241 (1985); UNIF. RESI7B U.L.A. 444 (1985) (explaining

additional uniform codes that recognize unconscionability).
20. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1990); Prince, supra note 10, at 468-71.
21. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1990).
22. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, § 4.28. "That the term is incapable of precise definition is a source of both strength and weakness." Id.
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).
24. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1990).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979); FARNSWORTH,
supra note 12, § 4.28.
26. See Leff, supra note 12, at 487. But see Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 752-54
(arguing that distinguishing between procedural and substantive unconscionability is
too stringent to allow development of the doctrine).
27. Leff, supra note 12, at 487 (discussing section 2-302 of the U.C.C.).
28. See id.
29. See Prince, supra note 10, at 472-73 nn.64-66 (1995) (providing a comprehensive look at the various jurisdictional requirements across the United States).
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which there is a substantially greater showing of one element over the
other element.3 °
Procedural unconscionability may take the form of oppression or
unfair surprise.3 ' Oppression is "inequality of bargaining power [that]
'32
results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice 33
while unfair surprise is the result of misleading bargaining conduct.
The courts, in varied types of contractual situations, have found oppression in a contract where a party may fully understand the terms
but has no meaningful choice outside the acceptance of the agreement.3 4 This is the situation that many songwriters face, and is the
reason why courts need to move away from current standards in the
music industry. In Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.,3 Bill Graham was a
prominent concert promoter who was instructed to "sign on the
dotted line" on a union contract in order to present a Leon Russell
concert. 36 When a dispute arose under the contract, a clause in the
contract required Graham to submit to mandatory arbitration.37 The
court found the arbitration portion of the contract to be boilerplate,
non-negotiable, and forced upon Graham if he wished for the concert
to take place.38 Graham, having been in the concert promotion business for some years, could not assert procedural unconscionability
under the theory of unfair surprise because he was well aware of the
terms of the agreement.39 The court found the requirement for procedural unconscionability was met by the oppressive nature of the
agreement even though the terms met the reasonable expectations of
the parties.4 °
Substantive unconscionability was also found in Graham. The court
looked to the unfairness of the arbitration clause to which Graham
was a party. 41 This clause allowed partiality on the part of an arbitra30. See Vockner v. Erickson, 712 P.2d 379 (Alaska 1986) (allowlng the concept of
unconscionability). See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, § 4.28; Prince, supra note
10, at 473.
31. See Prince, supra note 10, at 474.
32. See Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14482,
14484 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Dec. 21, 1990) (Phase II) (vacated pursuant to
settlement on appeal).
33. See Prince, supra note 10, at 474.
34. See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 171-73 (Cal. 1981).
35. Id.

36. See

O'DONNELL,

supra note 9, at 390.

37. See Graham, 623 P.2d at 173.
38. See id. at 176. Specifically, the court stated, "[I]n such cases as this, the agreement to arbitrate is essentially illusory. Here, clearly, 'minimum levels of integrity'
are not achieved, and the 'agreement to arbitrate' should be denied enforcement on
grounds of unconscionability." Id.

39. See id. at 173 (stating that the contract was not contrary to the reasonable
expectations of plaintiff Graham since he admitted to being party to many such agreements in the past).

40. See id.
41. See id.
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tor.42 It is easy to imagine, if someone with the status of Bill Graham
''43

"could have a take-it-or-leave-it contract forced down his throat,
that a party to a contract with little or no experience in an industry
would have no opportunity for negotiation. 44
Some jurisdictions have analogized Leff's theory to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 208. For instance, in Vockner v.
Erickson,4 5 the Alaska Supreme Court dissected section 208 in much
the same way Leff divided Uniform Commercial Code section 2-302.1
The court viewed the setting of how and why the contract was made,
along with the factors of oppression and unfair surprise.47 In relying
upon Restatement (Second) section 208 and the Uniform Commercial
Code section 2-302, the court applied the underlying principle of unconscionability. 4 Generally, courts should not disturb the allocation
of risks because of superior bargaining power of one party if the contract does not meet the factors of substantive unconscionability. 49 In
Vockner, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's holding that both procedural and substantive unconscionability existed in
the contract. 50 The Alaska Supreme Court would not interfere with
the lower court's finding.51 Further, the court stated in dicta that substantive unconscionability alone could be enough to support a finding
of unconscionability in a contract.52 Courts that recognize either a
sliding scale as to procedural and substantive unconscionability, or
those that would allow a claim to lie on a showing of substantive unconscionability alone, have allowed the doctrine to progress beyond
its initial limits of unfair surprise and oppression.5 3
Returning to the bargain principle, which undergirds one's ability to
contract freely, courts have been reluctant to utilize unconscionability
for fear of disturbing the foundation of contract law.5 4 In acknowledgment of this fear, Professor Farnsworth stated, "On the whole,
judges have been cautious in applying the doctrine of unconscionabil42. See id. at 173-74. But see Prince, supra note 10, at 511-12. Prince argues that
the court did not find sufficient unfairness and that this decision was the beginning of
what he views as California's "problematic unconscionability decisions." Id. at 512.
43. O'DONNELL, supra note 9, at 391.
44. See id.
45. 712 P.2d 379 (Alaska 1986).
46. See id. at 381-82.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 382 n.3 (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208

cmt. d (1981)).
50. See id. at 383 n.8.
51. See id.
52. See id. Specifically, the court stated in dicta that "there have been exceptional
cases where a provision of the contract is so outrageous as to warrant holding it unenforceable on the ground of substantive unconscionability alone." Gillman v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824, 829 (N.Y. 1988) (citations omitted).

53. See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 752-53.
54. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 12, § 4.28.
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ity, recognizing that the parties often must make their contract
quickly, that their bargaining power will rarely be equal, and that
courts are ill-equipped to deal with problems of unequal distribution
of wealth in society." 55
The doctrine of adhesion is often discussed side-by-side with the
doctrine of unconscionability. An adhesive contract is usually a standardized contract in which the weaker party has two options-take it
or leave it.56 A finding of adhesion is only "the beginning and not the
end of the analysis insofar as enforceability of [the contract's] terms is
concerned." 57 Unconscionability must be found in addition to the

contract's adhesive nature.
B.

What Are Exclusive Songwriter Agreements?

The crux of an exclusive songwriter agreement 59 ("ESA") is the assignment by the songwriter of all of his interest in the copyright for
songs that he will write during the term of the agreement. 60 The term
usually consists of an initial one-year period followed by several oneyear renewal options. 6 Although the copyright is transferred to the
publisher, the writer retains fifty percent of the income-"the writer's
from performance, mechanical and other royalty
share" 6 26-generated
3
sources.

In the "English Music Trilogy" cases, the terms of the agreements
were for five years with a renewal option available to the publisher/
manager for an additional five years. 64 This extended term, combined
55. Id.
56. See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 171 (Cal. 1981); FARNSWORTH,
supra note 12, § 4.28.
57. Graham, 623 P.2d at 172 (citation omitted).
58. See id. at 172-73.
59. In addition to exclusive songwriter agreements, single song agreements are
prevalent in the music publishing industry. See generally 2 ALEXANDER LINDEY ET
AL., LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 7.01[1][b] (2d ed.
1996). This Comment will not focus on the use of single song agreements. Single
song agreements are signed between a songwriter and publisher for individual songs
rather than for songs written during a set period of time. See id. When an ESA is not
involved, there is no requirement of exclusivity on the part of the songwriter, nor is
there a term of years. See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MusIc LICENSING 104
(2d ed. 1996). A songwriter may sign single song agreements when under an ESA for
record keeping purposes, or a songwriter without an exclusive agreement can use the
single song agreement to get a foot in the door with several different publishing companies. See id.
60. See 2 LINDEY ET AL., supra note 59, § 7.01[1][b].

61. See 4

MELVILLE

B.

NIMMER

&

DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

§ 24.02[A] (1995) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
62. Id. at § 24.02[D].
63. See id.; 2 LINDEY ET AL., supra note 59, § 7.01[1][b].
64. See O'Sullivan v. Management Agency & Music Ltd., 3 All E.R. 351 (C.A.
1985); Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. WEA Records Ltd., 1 All E.R. 237 (C.A.
1975); A Schroeder Music Publ'g Co. v. Macaulay, 3 All E.R. 616 (H.L. 1974). See
also discussion infra Part II.A.
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with the one-sidedness of the agreements in favor of the publisher and
the fact that the music publisher had no duty to use his best efforts to
exploit the songs, led each court to hold the agreements void as restraints on trade.65 An extended term is not as prevalent today in
United States agreements. Also, in California there is a seven-year
66
limit on personal service contracts of employees.

The term of the ESA ties the writer to the publisher for a set period. Reversion of rights, or lack thereof, ties the song to the publisher. Two types of reversions are normally considered. First, there
may be certain conditions 67 that the publisher must fulfill in the ESA
or the copyright reverts, or, in more appropriate language, is reassigned to the writer from the publisher.
The second manner in which a reversion occurs is not found in the
ESA but in The Copyright Act of 1976 ("The Act").6 8 The Act sets
forth a manner in which the publisher's rights are terminated and the
copyright reverts to the writer or other persons owning the termination interests. 69 This termination occurs "thirty-five years from the
date of publication of the work under the grant or at the end of forty
65. See generally O'Sullivan, 3 All E.R. at 351 (stating that the agreements were
void because there had been undue influence and unreasonable restraint of trade);
Davis, 1 All E.R. at 237 (holding that the agreements made between the plaintiff and
defendant were unenforceable as a result of inequality in bargaining power); Macaulay, 3 All E.R. at 616 (stating that a lack of obligation on the part of a defendant and a
total commitment from a plaintiff to his detriment will lead a contract to be void as an
unreasonable restraint of trade).
66. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (1989). "A contract to render personal service...
may not be enforced against the employee beyond seven years ... ." Id. The key
word in the statute is employee. Independent contractors are not protected by section
2855. See Ketcham v. Hall Syndicate, Inc., 236 N.Y.S.2d 206 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962),
affd, 242 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1963). The plaintiff was the creator of the "Dennis The Menace" cartoon character and strip. See id. at 207. Because the defendant did not control the creativity of the artist or withhold income taxes or social security, the court
found that section 2855 was inapplicable. See id. at 212. See also Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740-41 (1989) (analyzing the general
common law of agency in determining whether an employment relationship existed
for copyright purposes); Don E. Tomlinson, Everything that Glitters is not Gold:
Songwriter-Music Publisher Agreements and Disagreements, 18 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT-. L.J. 85, 102-03 (distinguishing the term employee from independent contractor
in exclusive songwriter agreements). Many songwriters do not fall into the category
of employees but rather have the status of independent contractors. See id.
67. This type of clause in an ESA is generally found in agreements in which the
writer has substantial bargaining power, i.e., probably not what would be termed an
unconscionable agreement. Normally these clauses require the publisher to secure a
recording or at least a hold on a song by a major recording artist within six months to
one year of creation of the work or the copyright in the work is reassigned to the
songwriter. See KOHN, supra note 59, at 108-09; Tomlinson, supra note 66, at 139-41.
See also Macaulay, 3 All E.R. at 616. Subsequent to Macaulay, many English publishers have added a reversion clause to take effect two years after the end of the ESA
term if the song has not been exploited. See BIEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 547.
68. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
69. See id. This section does not apply to "works made for hire." Works for hire
are defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101. See also Tomlinson, supra note 66, at 94.
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years from the date of execution of the grant, whichever term ends
earlier."'7 Although this section of The Act allows the writer, his
heirs, or assigns to re-capture the copyright, in effect this creates a
long-term agreement between the writer and publisher that extends
past the actual term of the ESA. The writer will continue to look to
this publisher for exploitation of the work and any royalties earned
and payable after the ESA term has expired. Most writers overlook
the totality and duration of the copyright conveyance. Once a standard ESA is signed, the writer has little or no input as to who records
his songs or how his songs are exploited.7 '
In addition to language regarding the term of the agreement and
reversion of rights, most ESAs also include a clause in which the
writer has a minimum commitment of songs that must be submitted
and approved by the publisher each year.72 In some agreements, if
the minimum commitment is not met, the term will continue until the
requisite number of songs have been completed and accepted.
In sum, the songwriter agrees to write songs exclusively for the publisher for an initial term that is normally followed by several one-year
options. The initial step towards getting a song "cut" by an artist is
having a quality demonstration recording ("demo"). 7 3 It is important
to a songwriter that there is a clause in the agreement that the publisher agrees to "quality productions" of the song. The demo clause
may or may not require the songwriter to pay his pro-rata share of the
cost as a recoupment from royalties earned.7 4 In return, what is the
publisher's commitment to the writer? The goal of the publisher and
songwriter is to make money. In order to do this, the songs must be
recorded, released, and earn royalties. The publisher must work on a
creative level with the writer in addition to promoting and protecting
the copyrights.
In addition to demos, the publisher should be obligated to exploit
the songs. 76 Exploitation is an ethereal description. The obligation in
these and other personal service contracts is one of best efforts.7 7
70. 17 U.S.C. § 203(3).

71. See KOHN, supra note 59, at 130-32 (listing provisions a songwriter should try
to include in an ESA). See also NASHVILLE SONGWRITERS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL, THE ESSENTIAL SONGWRITER'S CONTRACT HANDBOOK 78-80 (1994) [hereinafter NASHVILLE SONGWRITERS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL].

72. See Tomlinson, supra note 66, at 118.

73. See SIDNEY SHEMEL & M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC
262-64 (5th ed. 1985).
74. See id. at 263-64.
75. See BIEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 535.
76. See 2 LINDEY ET AL., supra note 59, § 7.01[a].
77. See Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) (holding that
reasonable efforts were implied from the language and nature of the contract). See
also Tomlinson, supra note 66, at 161-62 (stating that the publisher is obliged to use its
reasonable best efforts).
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Within the section pertaining to exploitation the writer should request
a "key-man" 78 clause.
Following the duty of exploitation is the duty to account and pay
royalties to the songwriter.79 If the writer wrote 100% of the composition, he is typically entitled to fifty percent of the earnings from performance, mechanical and synchronization royalties and, normally, a
set royalty on sheet music sales.8° A future technology clause should
be included that allows the writer to share in fifty percent of income
from those sources.8 Writers normally collect a weekly draw from
their publisher. This is an advance against future earnings that is
recoupable from royalties earned.82 An audit clause is often found
which allows the songwriter, within a set number of years or accounting periods, to audit the records of the publishing company. 83
Unconscionability in contacts arises from both the lack of a duty of
exploitation by the publisher and the accounting provisions within the
contract. It is important that the songwriter push the publisher to provide a clear and concise accounting statement. The writer needs to
understand the full implication of what is being charged against his
royalties as advances.
78. SHEMEL, supra note 73, at 93. A key-man or person is normally the song
"plugger" who is employed by the publisher to pitch the songs to the recording artists,

producers and record labels. See

BIEDERMAN ET AL.,

supra note 5, at 536. A close

relationship is usually developed between the song "plugger" and writer. Writers
with bargaining power are able to tie the life of their ESA to the employment of one

person at the publishing company. See NASHVILLE SONGWRITERS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL, supra note 71, at 82-84.
79. See BIEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 548.
80. See generally 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 61, § 24.02[D]. For exam-

ple, in a typical situation, the writer's share is equal to that of the publisher. If there is
only one publisher, but more than one songwriter, the songwriters Will divide the
writer's share.
81. In 1992 Congress passed the Audio Home Recording Act, now known as the
Digital Audio Recording Technology Act. See 17 U.S.C.A § 1001 (West 1996). This
legislation allows songwriters and music publishers to collect a royalty from the sale of

all digital software and hardware. See

NASHVILLE SONGWRITERS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL, supra note 71, at 42-46. Digital technology is relatively new. For ex-

ample, a songwriter who signed an ESA ten years ago that did not include a future
technology clause, may be unable to collect the royalties earned by his publisher from
the Audio Home Recording Act.

82. See KOHN, supra note 59, at 109, 143-44; NASHVILLE SONGWRITERS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL, supra note 71, at 33-35; SHEMEL, supra note 74, at 175-76.
Publishers normally account and pay their songwriters semi-annually. Statements and
checks are issued in February for the period ending in December of the preceding
year and in August for the period ending June of that year. See id. If a songwriter
was advanced $100.00 per week, in one year his recoupable balance would be
$5,200.00. Assuming the songwriter's account was credited $5,000.00 by December 31
of his first year, he would still have a recoupable balance of $200.00. See id. The
songwriter would receive a credit but no actual payments until the royalties exceed
the advance balance. See id.
83. See SHEMEL, supra note 73, at 175-76.
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Other general terms in the ESA include representation and warranty clauses, indemnification and forum clauses, and language regarding waiver and modification of the agreement.84
C.

Unconscionabilityand the Exclusive Songwriter Agreement

The courts have viewed ESAs as hard bargains that may be entered
into by a party that has no bargaining power, but adherence to industry norms removes the contract from the realm of unconscionability8 5
The standardized agreements may be, in effect, viewed as adhesive,
but United States courts have not taken steps beyond this initial inquiry to find unconscionability. Courts, in reviewing these agreements, should reject the current industry standard that allows the
enforcement of unconscionable contractual terms in music industry
contracts.
Courts have always based their examination of unconscionability
against the background of the contract's setting.86 Thus, terms standing on their own in one industry may be unconscionable, but when
introduced in a contract in another industry, the court will uphold
these seemingly unconscionable clauses.
The standard terms of an ESA and their application seem relatively
fair and impartial.87 It is the variation on those terms that has become
the standard industry practice that creates the unconscionable nature
of an ESA. Procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability are present in what has become the standardized agreement
that is followed by most publishers when dealing with unestablished
songwriters. The lack of bargaining power that most songwriters face
qualifies for the procedural unconscionability aspect, 88 whereas substantive unconscionability stems from the lopsided terms found in the
agreement that are unreasonably favorable to one party-normally
the party drafting the contract. 89 The specific portions of the ESA
that lend itself to unconscionability can be found when there is no
requirement that the publisher exploit the songs and in the accounting
and administration procedures followed by music publishers. 90
Why, when it seems so obvious that ESAs tend to include unconscionable terms, are there not more lawsuits filed in the United States
challenging these agreements? The answer is simple: money.9 ' The
84. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 61, § 24.02[D]. For an example of
an ESA, see form 24-4, discussing various terms included within such an agreement.
See id.
85. See Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 737 F.2d 229
(2d Cir. 1984).
86. See id.
87. See supra Part I.B.
88. See Tomlinson, supra note 66, at 176.
89. See Leff, supra note 12, at 512-15.
90. See infra Part II.
91. See Tomlinson, supra note.66, at 178.
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unestablished songwriter needs an exclusive writing agreement to
make ends meet. Thus, without that agreement, there is no money
flowing in that can be used to finance a lawsuit. Further, songwriters
fear alienation from the songwriting community.92 An unestablished
songwriter may risk his whole career if he brings suit against a publisher. 93 The songwriter and/or recording artist that has reached some
level of success is more prone to file suit against the publisher or record label and actually have a fair chance of reaching trial. Unfortunately, courts avoid finding unconscionability in a contract when a
party has benefited from an agreement, 94 even though the benefits are
not what they could have been had portions of the agreement not
been unconscionable.
Songwriters sign these agreements because they have a creative
product that requires the money and marketing ability of a music publisher. 95 The music publishing marketplace is one in which most publishers present the same agreement to new writers, and the supply of
songwriters is always greater than the demand.96
The flip-side of the songwriter's argument is the assertion by the
publisher that she is bearing all the risk by signing the unknown songwriter. 97 By itself, the lack of a promotional guarantee clause in the
contract will normally not suffice to declare the contracts illusory.98
Any advances paid normally constitute adequate consideration.99 The
publisher will probably pay an advance against royalties and the initial
payment of demo costs. These expenses are recoupable from the
songwriter's royalties and are not refundable from the songwriter personally. 10 If songs written while under the ESA never generate royalties, the publisher has lost her front money.
Even with an agreement that extends to three years, it is very unlikely that the first taste of success will appear in a monetary fashion
92. See SHEMEL, supra note 73, at 168.
93. See Jack Mathews, Who Laughs Last? After the Buchwald vs. ParamountRulings, All Parties Put on their Best Faces, but the Winner was the Status Quo, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 1992, at 6. "[Wlho's going to risk whatever future they might have in
a tight-knit company town on the chance that they might win enough to buy a new
word processor?" Id. The comments made by the article are applicable to the music
industry as well as the film industry.
94. See Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 737 F.2d 229
(2d Cir. 1984). The court found the actions of Jim Croce's manager/publisher did not
rise to the level of unconscionability when Croce made millions under the contract.
See id.
95. See Tomlinson, supra note 66, at 91.
96. See id. at 176-77.
97. See Croce, 565 F. Supp. at 893; O'DONNELL, supra note 9, at 381-82, 400-01.
98. See Bonner v. Westbound Records, Inc., 394 N.E.2d 1303, 1308-09 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1979).
99. See id.; KOHN, supra note 59, at 137.
100. See Tomlinson, supra note 66, at 120-21.
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until years later. 1 1 Loss of money can also be accounted for in loss of
time and energy spent by the song "plugger" and the administrative
staff on songs that are not successful. The time, energy, and money
could have been spent more effectively on other songs and songwriters. 10 2 How successful a songwriter or publisher will become cannot
be measured from the outset. "Judgment, taste, skill[,] and luck far
outweigh the time spent or the capital expended on any particular recording [or song].' 3 Success of an artist or songwriter is normally
a contract
viewed from the end result, whereas unconscionability 0 of
4
should be analyzed at the time the contract was made.1

II.

ANALYSIS

Although in many instances, reviewing contracts based on the setting in which they were made is beneficial, this method of analysis
should not be used to allow the court to continue to adhere to unconscionable industry standards. A court's persistent reliance upon unconscionable industry standards allows a vicious cycle of oppression to
be maintained against inexperienced and unestablished songwriters.
The unconscionable clauses are found within the duty, or lack thereof,
of a publisher to exploit the writer's songs and within the accounting
and administration procedures. Each of the cases in the analysis section focus on one or more of these elements and addresses why these
terms are unconscionable. While both American and English courts
have dealt with songwriter suits against publishers, looking specifically
at the contract, each court has focused on different arguments. Yet, in
each case, the fact patterns are similar. In American courts, plaintiffs
have used the theory of unconscionability, focusing on the terms in
the contract. English courts, on the other hand, have seen restraint of
trade arguments made by songwriters against publishers.
Part A of the analysis section will briefly focus on cases that have
become known as the "English Music Trilogy,"'0 5 while Part B will
address the error in the holding of Croce v. Kurnit. °6 The decision in
Buchwald /I7 will be analogized and applied in Part C to offer courts
101. See O'DONNELL, supra note 9, at 408. Paramount Pictures paid $1 million for
the film rights to the stage production of Evita in 1982. See Joe Morgenstern, Film:
New Takes on 'Evita,' a Great Dane and Others, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 1996, at 4. The

motion picture was not released until December 1996. See id.
102. See Tomlinson, supra note 66, at 90-91.
103. Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 737 F.2d 229 (2d
Cir. 1984).
104. See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1990).
105. See O'Sullivan v. Management Agency & Music Ltd., 3 All E.R. 351 (C.A.
1985); Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. WEA Records Ltd., 1 All E.R. 237 (C.A.
1975); A Schroeder Music Publ'g Co. v. Macaulay, 3 All E.R. 616 (H.L. 1974).
106. 565 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 737 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1984).
107. 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14482 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Dec. 21, 1990)
(Phase II) (vacated pursuant to settlement on appeal).
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guidance on how to address the current unconscionable industry standards in music industry agreements.
A.

The "English Music Trilogy"

The three cases in England relating to music publishing and artist
management agreements that struck down what would be considered
unconscionableterms in the United States are often referred to as the
"English Music Trilogy."' 8 The cases were not decided on the doctrine of unconscionability, but rather, the theory of unreasonable restraint of trade. 0 9 The court found the agreements in A Schroeder
Music PublishingCo. v. Macaulay,"' Clifford Davis Management Ltd.
v. WEA Records Ltd.,"' and O'Sullivan v. Management Agency &
Music Ltd.,112 void as against public policy.
In Macaulay, the songwriter agreed to a five year ESA." a3 The publisher presented the songwriter with a standard form agreement that
did not require the publisher to exploit the writer's songs in any manner."14 The agreement further allowed the publisher to revoke the
agreement at any time, while not providing the corresponding right to
the writer."15 The publisher could also invoke a five year renewal after the end of the initial term." 6 The court disagreed with the publisher's argument that the contract -should be upheld because the
"agreement is in standard form, that it has stood the test of time, and
that there is no indication that it ever causes injustice." 117
The facts of Davis are similar to those found in Croce v. Kurnit.118
In Croce, the defendant also had the dual role of artist manager and
music publisher." 9 The defendant in Davis was the manager of the
recording group Fleetwood Mac and the publisher for Christine
McVie and Robert Welch, two of the group's other members.' 2 The
English court rejected industry standards in Davis.121 The court found
that not only was the ten year term unreasonable, but that Davis had a
108. See O'Sullivan, 3 All E.R. at 351; Davis, 1 All E.R. at 237; Macaulay, 3 All
E.R. at 616.
109. See Tomlinson, supra note 66, at 96.
110. 3 All E.R. 616 (H.L. 1974).
111. 1 All E.R. 237 (C.A. 1975).
112. 3 All E.R. 351 (C.A. 1985).
113. See Macaulay, 3 All E.R. at 616.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 617.
116. See id. at 620.

117. Id. at 622.
118. 565 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 737 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1984).
119. See Croce, 565 F. Supp. at 892.
120. See Clifford Davis Management, Ltd. v. WEA Records, Ltd., 1 All E.R. 237,

238 (C.A. 1975).
121. See Davis, 1 All E.R. at 237.
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substantial conflict of interest in representing the group and its individual members in more than one capacity.' 22
Multiple hats were also worn by the defendant in O'Sullivan.
Singer and songwriter Gilbert O'Sullivan successfully had the recording, publishing, and management contracts with the defendant declared void. 23

However, the English court has been unwilling to utilize the restraint of trade theory to void a contract when an artist, at the time of
making the contract, has a sufficiently established track record. 24 Pop
superstar George Michael settled out of court after the English Limited High Court dismissed his claims against Sony Music Entertain25

ment for unreasonable restraint of trade and unfair competition.
The court found that Michael was adequately represented and had the
influence to negotiate his contract.1 2 6
Subsequent to these decisions, the English music industry revamped
the term of personal services contracts and re-allocated the risk to
both parties by requiring, at a minimum, that the publisher use her
best efforts in promoting the songwriter's works. 27 The English
courts were aware not only of the unequal bargaining power of the
songwriters and artists, but also realized that rejection of industry
standards would allow for new, more equal, standards to be implemented. United States courts have yet to implement the analysis of
the "English Music Trilogy" decisions.
B.

Croce v. Kurnit

Croce v. Kurnit 28 is one of the few United States cases to discuss
what constitutes industry norms in the music publishing industry. 2 9
Jim Croce's widow, Ingrid, sued her late husband's personal manger
and publisher for several causes of action including unconscionability
in the management and publishing agreements. 3 ° Croce signed all
122. See id. at 237, 239 (stating that the ten year term "tied [Davis's] hand and feet
to the publisher.").
123. See O'Sullivan v. Management Agency & Music, Ltd., 3 All E.R. 351, 354
(C.A. 1985).
124. See Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd., 13 Tr. L. 532 (Ch.
1994).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See BIEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 547.
128. 565 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 737 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1984).
129. See id. at 893. Compare "The English Music Trilogy" cases discussing how the
English courts have addressed industry norms in the publishing business by declining
to uphold contracts as restraints on trade. See discussion supra Part II.A.; infra Part
II.C.3.
130. See Croce, 565 F. Supp. at 885, 886. Croce is most often cited for its discussion
regarding the fiduciary duty or lack thereof that a personal manager owes to a recording artist which he represents. See, e.g., H.G. Heine v. Colton, Hartnick, Yamin &
Sheresky, 786 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that an attorney may owe a fiduciary duty to someone with whom there is no formal attorney-client relationship);
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agreements that were the subject of the lawsuit without prior consultation with independent counsel."' In 1968, the time of the signing of
these contracts, Croce had not known success as an artist or songwriter. 132 There were a few
minor changes made to the contract, but
1 33
there was no negotiation.
The publishing contract granted all rights to the publishing company and could be extended through a seven-year period.' 34 Only two
duties were placed upon the publisher: (1) to pay each of the Croces
35
$600.00 per year, and (2) to pay royalties if any records were sold.'
Ingrid found unfavorable certain aspects of the contract, including the
royalty provision, reversion of the copyrights, and the time for objecting to royalty accounting. 136 The court looked at these issues and
found that the clauses were really no different from the standard
137
forms published by entertainment industry organizations.
The court in Croce divided its unconscionability discussion into substantive and procedural components. In its discussion of substantive
unconscionability, the court conceded that "the contracts were hard
bargains, signed by an artist without bargaining power, and favored
the publishers.' 1 38 The court continued its analysis by simply stating
that the contracts did not "shock the conscience or differ[ ] so grossly
from industry norms as to be unconscionable by their terms.' 39 In
finding the situation surrounding the signing of the contracts was not
one of haste and high pressure, coupled with the fact that Jim Croce
benefited from the contracts, the court held the contracts lacked procedural unconscionability. 4 ° The court's opinion does not discuss
whether or not it analyzed each contract or specific contract terms
individually. A more effective mode of interpretation would have
consisted of separating each contract and looking at the individual
terms.
In Croce, it was enough for the court that the contracts signed by
Jim Croce were no different from the standardized agreements used
throughout the industry to hold that there was no showing of unconscionability. Arguably, this decision would be, and should be, differMcLaughlin v. Biasucci, 688 F. Supp. 965 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that absent an
express attorney-client relationship, a lawyer may owe a fiduciary duty to people they
deal with).
131. See id. at 887.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 888.
137. See id. at 888, 893.
138. Id. at 893.
139. Id.
140. See id.
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ent today if unconscionability were analyzed in the manner set forth in
Buchwald 11.14"
C. Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp.
1. Factual Background and Procedural History
Art Buchwald is one of America's best known humorists. He writes
column that is published in over 550 newspapers world
syndicated
a
wide and holds a Pulitzer Prize for commentary. 142 Buchwald tried his
hand at a screen proposal based on a scene he personally witnessed
when the Shah of Iran visited the White House to meet President
Jimmy Carter.1 43 Buchwald submitted his idea to long time friend
Alain Bernheim. A two and one-half page screen treatment was submitted to Paramount entitled It's a Crude, Crude World 144 that was
sold to Paramount Pictures in 1983 for their superstar Eddie Murphy
and renamed King for a Day.1 45 Paramount supposedly dropped the
idea,' 46 and Bernheim pitched the idea to Warner Bros. Studio who
picked up Bernheim's option. 47 Warner Bros. decided not to produce
the project when Paramount released a movie substantially similar to
Bernheim's idea entitled Coming to America, 4 8 starring Eddie Murphy. 49 Coming to America grossed over $350 million. 5 °
Buchwald and Bernheim sued Paramount Pictures Corp. not only
for breach of contract for using their idea without paying, but also
under the theory of unconscionability.' 51 The court divided the Buchwald trial into three phases. In Phase One, the court found that Paramount's film Coming to America was based on the screen treatment
141. 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14482 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Dec. 21, 1990)
(Phase II) (vacated pursuant to settlement on appeal). Although the judgment in
Buchwald has been set aside, the court's analysis on the issue of unconscionability
serves as an excellent starting point for reviewing unconscionability in ESAs. See
supra note 9. (explaining the Buchwald case history). See also Robert W. Welkos,
Buchwald, ParamountSettle Film Dispute, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1995, at D. In settlement of the case, Buchwald and Bernheim received $825,000 and the judgment
against Paramount was vacated. See id. It is estimated that over $12 million was
spent by all parties on the lawsuit. See id.
142. See O'DONNELL, supra note 9, at xv, xxiii.
143. See id. at xv.
144. See id. at xxv.
145. See id. Based on the agreements signed with Paramount, Buchwald was to
receive $65,000, 1.5% of the net profits, and a screen credit if Paramount made the
film. See id. As the producer, Alain would receive $200,000 plus 40% of net profits,
reducible to 17.5% under a studio formula if stars, directors and/or writers were cut in
on the profit pie. See id.
146. See Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C706083, 1990 WL 357611, at
*5 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Jan. 8, 1990) (Phase I) (vacated pursuant to settlement on appeal) (Buchwald I).
147. See id. at *6.

148.

COMING TO AMERICA

(Paramount 1983).

149. See Buchwald I, 1990 WL 357611, at *6.
150. See Larry Rohter, Judge Rejects ParamountRequest, but Buchwald Hasn't Won
Yet, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1991, at Cl.

151. See

BIEDERMAN ET AL.,

supra note 5, at 450.
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written by Buchwald and pitched by Bernheim. 1 52 After reaching the
conclusion that Paramount had breached its contract with Buchwald
and Bernheim, 15 3 Buchwald sought and effectively persuaded the
court in Phase II (Buchwald'II) of the trial that portions of the contract signed with Paramount were unconscionable. 5 4 In Phase Three
of the trial, the court determined 1the
damages based upon finding the
55
net profits terms unconscionable.
2.

Net Profits Clause

In addition to receiving an up-front fee for the idea, Buchwald's
contract with Paramount also included a 1.5% for payment of net
profits. 1 56 Net profits are generally defined as "gross receipts reduced
by distribution fees and expenses and the direct and indirect production costs"'1 57 of the film. "These offsets are substantial; thus, the 'net
profits' figure is usually far smaller than the gross receipts figure."' 58
Gross receipts encompass the total revenue a film receives.159 Even
though the movie grossed $350 million, Paramount's accountants
claimed the movie actually had no net profits and lost $18 million
based on the standardized net profits clause found in Buchwald's
contract.' 60 Buchwald's calculation of Paramount's net profit was
$39,800.161
152. See Buchwald I, 1990 WL 357611, at *14.
153. See id at *15.
154. See generally Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 90 Daily Journal D.A.R.
14482 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Dec. 21, 1990) (Phase II) (vacated pursuant to
settlement on appeal). The net profit provisions named unconscionable included a (1)
fifteen percent overhead on Eddie Murphy Productions Operation allowance, (2) ten
percent advertising overhead not in proportion to actual costs, (3) fifteen percent
overhead not in proportion to actual costs, (4) charging interest on negative cost balance without credit for distribution fees, (5) charging interest on overhead, (6) charging interest on profit participation payments, and (7) charging an interest rate not in
proportion to the actual cost of funds. See id. at 14487.
155. See Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C706083 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A.
County, Mar. 16, 1992) (Phase III) (vacated pursuant to settlement on appeal) (Buchwald III).
156. See O'DONNELL, supra note 9, at xxv.
157. Mary Lafrance, Trouble in Transamerica: Deferred Compensation, Contingent
Debt, and Overstated Basis, 15 VA. TAX REV. 685, 737 n.17 (1996).
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. See O'DONNELL, supra note 9, at 392. See also ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY
CONTRAcrs, NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING GUIDE, ch. 28 (Donald C. Farber ed.
1990) (giving examples of net profit definitions used by several major studios and a
detailed analysis of those terms). Buchwald is not the first person to challenge the net
profit's language. James Garner, the star of The Rockford Files made a $12 million
settlement with Universal Studios; Jane Fonda received an undisclosed settlement
from Universal for her role in On Golden Pond; and the stars of Hart To Hart settled
for approximately $5 million from Columbia Pictures Industries. See Dana Wechsler,
Profits? What Profits (Hollywood's New Profit Contracts), FORBES, Feb. 19, 1990, at
38.
161. See O'DONNELL, supra note 9, at 392.
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3. Procedural & Substantive Unconscionability
Thus, the court's analysis of unconscionability turns on how and
why this net profits clause is included in Buchwald's and Bernheim's
contract. 162 The court took the initial step in finding the net profits
participation agreement an adhesion contract. 163 Even though both
Bernheim and Buchwald were represented by highly regarded talent
agents, and both men were well-versed in contractual relationships
and well aware of their duty to uphold the agreements, 164 the net profits portion was non-negotiable with Paramount. The court found that
only parties with clout could negotiate the net profits clause. 6 5
"Clout" was not defined by the court. From the tenor of the court's
language, it can be inferred that "clout" means power or influence. 166
Without the required clout, the agreements were presented on a take
it or leave it basis and this was the mode of operation throughout the
film industry.' 6 7 Buchwald did not have a meaningful choice at Para68
mount or any other studio that he might present with his idea.'
Mass modifications of clauses in these types of agreements only occur
when one studio revises a provision and the other studios then fall in
line. 169 Finding that the contract was one of adhesion was only the
first step. The court
also found both procedural and substantive
70
unconscionability.1
As in Graham v. Scissor-Tail,Inc.,171 Buchwald could not claim unfair surprise because the net profits language was an industry norm. 72
Although unfair surprise is deemed unconscionable under the doctrine of unconscionability, oppression is also considered unconscionable under this doctrine. 7 3 The court found the non-negotiation, the
162. The opinion issued in Phase II speaks directly to Bernheim's agreement.
163. See generally Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 90 Daily Journal D.A.R.
14482 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Dec. 21, 1990) (Phase II) (vacated pursuant to
settlement on appeal). The court in Phase II directly addressed the Bernheim agreement. See id. at 14482-83. The two agreements, Buchwald's and Bernheim's, were
tied together with Bernheim as the producer and Buchwald as the creator of the idea.
See id.
164. See O'DoNNELL, supra note 9, at 390-91. (comparing Graham v. Scissor Tail,
Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 171 (Cal. 1981), with Buchwald II and finding the terms of the
agreement unconscionable even though Graham had clout in the music industry along
with the fact that Buchwald and Bernheim had only limited stature in the film
industry).
165. See Buchwald II, 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 14483.
166. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY 251 (9th ed. 1983).
167. See Buchwald H, 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 14482-83. The net profits agreements were so un-negotiable as to be pre-printed and bound in tablet form for ease of
the studio in generating contracts. See O'DONNELL, supra note 9, at 407.
168. See O'DONNELL, supra note 9, at 386.
169. See Buchwald II, 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 14483.
170. See id. at 14484.
171. 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).
172. See Buchwald II, 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 14484.
173. See U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1990); Prince, supra note 10, at 473.
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lack of choice and Buchwald's general inability to bargain, even with
representation, rose to the level of procedural unconscionability. 174
The court recognized that contracts are a matter of risk allocation.
Under a substantive unconscionability analysis, the court will look
closely to find whether the terms are so disproportionate as to place
the risk of the bargain to one party "in an objectively unreasonable or
unexpected manner. ' 175 The court also found the greater the inability
to bargain (procedural unconscionability), the less toleration it will
have for lopsided terms. 176 In essence, the court applied a slidingscale analysis where a greater showing of procedural unconscionability will compensate for a weaker finding of substantive
unconscionability.77
4.

Applying Buchwald I to the ESA
a. Croce v. Kurnit Revisited
The analysis used in Buchwald should be followed in future ESA
cases litigating the issue of unconscionability. Although the facts in
the Buchwald cases are somewhat distinguishable from Croce, the
Croce court would have been well served if they had applied an analysis similar to that used later in Buchwald II.
The most impressive action taken by the court in Buchwald II was
its rejection of industry norms when those standards of operation
were unacceptable. The court moved past the element of surprise
where arguably the court in Croce would not make further analysis
after finding the contracts "were not formulated so as to obfuscate or
confuse the terms." 78 The Croce court combined its substantive unconscionability analysis and procedural unconscionability analysis
when addressing the standardized agreements and risk allocation between the parties. Thus, the Croce court found the risk allocation was
greater on the defendant's side because there was no adequate way to
determine who or what will become a success. 17 9 The court in Croce

also focused on the facts that the contracts were not signed under
pressure and that Jim Croce eventually made millions under the
80
agreements.1
The Croce court did not review the contract for unconscionability
from the time of the making of the contract or the bargaining process,
but rather looked at the outcome in making its decision. In Buchwald
174. See Buchwald II, 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 14484-85.
175. Id. at 14484.
176. See id. at 14484-85.
177. But see Prince, supra note 10, at 526-31 (Prince believes that the court's decision was incorrect and that there was not a thorough analysis of both procedural and

substantive unconscionability).

178. Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 737 F.2d 229 (2d

Cir. 1984).
179. See id.
180. See id. at 893-94.
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II, the court did not look at the end result that Coming to America
grossed more than $350 million. That option was removed and Paramount decided to drop its risk allocation defense when the court
presented its own expert to review Paramount's records on profitability. 181 Paramount initially argued that, because the studio bore such
expansive risk by purchasing the option, producing the film, and marketing the project, it should receive a greater portion of the profits to
compensate for films that fail.' 82 "The Court interpreted [that argument] to mean that Paramount was attempting to justify its net profit
formula on the ground that this'1 83formula was necessary for [its and
most all other studios] survival.'
Assuming that all parties to a contract used good faith and best efforts, and a song is written but never recorded by an artist, or a movie
idea is optioned by a studio but never produced, under either Croce or
Buchwald II a lawsuit would not be necessary because all parties
would have performed under the contract. Thus, the court's review of
the benefit that Croce received is misplaced. Whether or not a party
to the contract makes some money or receives some benefit from the
contract should have no bearing on how a court reviews the making of
the contract. 84 The court in Croce attempted to justify its decision by
stating that the contracts provided benefits to both parties.' 85 The net
profits agreement in Buchwald II also provided benefits to all parties,
but the problem was that the actual application of the clause providing
the benefits was unconscionable in and of itself. Some benefit to each
party
will not remove a contract from the realm of unconscionability 86 just as some ability to negotiate will not render a contract "unadhesive."
b. Accounting & Administration Procedures
Paramount attempted to persuade the court that providing "upfront" money to Buchwald for the idea and additional money if the
movie was produced was sufficient compensation and all that really
mattered to the plaintiffs. 87 With most creative people, getting the
project off the ground and then receiving compensation for that suc181. See Buchwald H, 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 14485.
182. See id.
183. Id.
184. See generally A Schroeder Music Publ'g Co. v. Macaulay, 3 All E.R. 616 (H.L.
1974) (reviewing the contract from the time of making and striking down the songwriter agreement as a restraint on trade rather than under the doctrine of
unconscionability).

185. See Croce, 565 F. Supp. at 893-94.
186. See Buchwald II, 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 14486. "I[T]he doctrine of unconscionability would be rendered nugatory if a contracting party could escape its application by negotiating some monetary provisions, while at the same time imposing
unjustifiably onerous provisions with respect to other contract provisions." See id.
187. See id.
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cess is also of great importance. 88 The up-front money can be compared to advances that are received by songwriters. Advances are

recoupable whereas up-front fees are not.1 89 Yes, the advance is important for weekly living, but if a songwriter is successful, his weekly

advance in most situations is not as lucrative as the royalties he will

earn."g All of the various minutiae that stood in the way of Buchwald
collecting his net profits often stand in the way of a songwriter collect-

ing his royalties apart from performance income. 191
To calculate the net profits amount, Paramount's contract charged
various overhead costs and spending allowances against the gross

earnings. 1 92 These types of expenses occur in the publishing industry

as administration fees.' 93 Administration is "the nuts and bolts of
publishing.'

94

The party holding this right can execute licenses and

contracts and collect the royalties generated from those agreements. 95 Often, fifteen to twenty percent is deducted from the gross
income received by the publisher before distribution of the songwriter's share. 196 The court in Buchwald II found that it was appropri-

ate to account for overhead expenses, but a flat fee that in no way
relates to actual costs may be unconscionable.1 97 The issue from the
perspective of the publisher is, by the time actual costs are determined, whether their effort will have exceeded the percentage withheld for administration.

The songwriter should also be aware of doubled administration
fees. Today, most independent publishers 19 8 have co-publishing or ad188. See id.
189. See NASHVILLE SONGWRITERS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL, supra note 71,
at 30-35 (stating that songwriters receive recoupable but non-refundable advances
against royalties). Bernheim received an up-front fee from Paramount for the idea
that eventually became the film Coming To America. See O'DONNELL, supra note 9,
at xxv.
190. See NASHVILLE SONGWRITERS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL, supra note 71,
at 33.
191. See 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 61, § 24.02[A]. Performance income is paid directly to the songwriter from his performance rights society. See id.
192. See Buchwald II, 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 14487.
193. See NASHVILLE SONGWRITERS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL, supra note 71,
at 23. Administration fees usually cover the time spent by the publisher in processing
incoming royalty statements from record labels, postage fees and copyright registration fees. See id. at 46-49. Songwriters should be aware that publishers may often
deduct demo costs and copyright fees from their royalties while also including these
expenses under the percentage withheld for administration costs. See id.
194. Id. at 25.
195. See id.

196. See

BIEDERMAN ET AL.,

supra note 5, at 530. Biederman presents the adminis-

tration agreement as one where the songwriter is in effect his own publisher. See id.
That scenario is found where the songwriter has no need for the creative services of a
publisher. Often, publishers contract with other companies to provide the administration services while they provide the creative factor the songwriter desires. See id.
197. See Buchwald 1!, 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 14487.
198. See generally BEIDERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 527-28 (stating that independent publishers ("Indies") are not subsidiaries of major publishers). Indies may
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ministration deals with larger or major publishers.1 99 The major/administering publisher will usually charge a percentage fee. If both the
publisher's and writer's shares are paid directly to the independent
publisher, the independent publisher may also charge a fee for issuing
the songwriter's check. When a copyright administration company is

involved, most songwriters have no knowledge that an administration
fee is deducted from their share of the earnings. The deduction often

is not accounted for on the writer's statement nor is language regarding this deduction found in the songwriter's agreement with his
publisher. 2"
Publishers often enter into agreements with foreign publishers to

collect royalties in specific foreign territories. 20 1 This sub-publishing

agreement allows the foreign publisher to retain up to twenty-five percent of the collection as payment for services.2 °2 It is standard industry practice for the United States publisher to divide only the

remaining seventy-five percent with the songwriter.

°3

These practices

2 °4

Only an estabfurther reduce the songwriter's share of royalties.
lished songwriter with a great deal of bargaining power can negotiate
his contract so that the division is based on the amount of royalties
earned at the source.
The Buchwald II court found that, while Paramount calculated expenses on an accrual basis, income was calculated on a cash basis.20 5
There was never a cutting off point for expenses that would allow an
accounting to be made for a set period of time. Songwriters should

also be aware of this method of accounting. Advances are normally
issued weekly, whereas royalty accounting periods occur quarterly or
semi-annually.20 6 If the advance period and demonstration fees are
not calculated simultaneously with the royalty earned period, it will be
or may not be small companies based on the number of writers and the amount of
income generated. See id. Major publishers include Warner/Chappell Music, EMI
Music, MCA Music, Sony Music, BMG Music Publishing and PolyGram Music. See
id.
199. See id.
200. See SHEMEL, supra note 73, at 171-72 (stating that songwriters should read and
attempt to understand their royalty statements).
201. See NASHVILLE SONGWRITERS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL, supra note 71,
at 49-50. See generally KOHN, supra note 59, at 299-387 (devoting a complete chapter
to the topic of sub-publishing).
202. See generally NASHVILLE SONGWRITERS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL, supra
note 71, at 49-50.
203. See KOHN, supra note 59, at 324-25; SHEMEL, supra note 74, at 230.
204. See BIEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 466. The court in Macaulay highlights
the sections of Macaulay's publishing agreement allowing the publisher's subsidiaries
to enter into various levels of sub-publishing agreements, thus continuing to reduce
the portion that should be payable to the songwriter due to each sub-publishers' fee.
See A Schroeder Music Publ'g Co. v. Macaulay, 3 All E.R. 616, 618-19 (H.L. 1974).
205. See Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14482,
14487 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Dec. 21, 1990) (Phase II) (vacated pursuant to
settlement on appeal).
206. See SHEMEL, supra note 73, at 175-76.
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difficult for a struggling or moderately successful writer to ever move
to the plus column.2" 7
20 8
Writers should be aware of the effect of cross collaterallization.
This accounting practice is discussed in Buchwald H under the winners
must pay for losers theory. Paramount asserted that the industry's
survival was dependent on this method of accounting. 20 9 This can occur when a publisher recoups demo expenses from all royalties earned
and not just the royalties relating to the specific song that was
"demoed, ' 11 ° or when the songwriter signs more than one type of
agreement with the publisher. Very often, as was found in Croce,21
the writer looks to one person as his publisher, manager, and producer.21 2 It is in the publisher's best interest to integrate the contracts
so that all earnings apply to the total outstanding advance. 1 3 Risk
allocation is exercised when a publisher has several writers signed to
ESAs. Even though the publisher does not charge one writer for the
expenses of another, the publisher utilizes the risk allocation doctrine
by applying the winners versus losers analysis to all income received.
Thus, by cross collateralizing the various agreements of writer X, the
publisher is retaining more income. This in turn allows the publisher
to reduce her risk against the possibility that writer Z will never generate any income for the publishing company. 1 4
c. Procedural& Substantive Unconscionability
Even when several terms within a contract are deemed unconscionable, the court is not required to strike the whole agreement, but may
remove only portions of the contract.215 Clauses standing on their
own may be unconscionable, but not render an entire contract unconscionable. Thus, the court in Croce should have analyzed the provisions individually as opposed to simply reviewing the contract as a
whole. In Buchwald II, Paramount argued that only clauses that are
divisible can be struck and that Buchwald was attacking intertwined
financial clauses.216 Obviously, a publisher would present this argu207. See Buchwald II, 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 14487.
208. See KOHN, supra note 59, at 110; NASHVILLE SONGWRITERS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL, supra note 71, at 89-92.
209. See Buchwald H, 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 14485.
210. See SHEMEL, supra note 73, at 263-64.
211. 565 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 737 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1984).
212. See id. at 893.
213. See generally Tomlinson, supra note 66, at 165 (exemplifying a cross-collateralized agreement). See also KOHN, supra note 59, at 144-45.
214. See O'DONNELL, supra note 9, at 429, 432.
215. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1990). But see A Schroeder Music Publ'g Co. v. Macaulay,
3 All E.R. 616 (H.L. 1974) (holding that a contract is to be reviewed as a whole as
opposed to reviewing individual terms).
216. See Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14482,
14487 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Dec. 21, 1990) (Phase II) (vacated pursuant to
settlement on appeal).
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ment while defending an ESA. Most questionable provisions concern
when and how money will be disbursed to the songwriter. Again, this
argument returns to risk allocation and the fact that publishers would
have paid less in advances if they had realized that their accounting
practices were going to be rejected by the court.217
A songwriter would probably never succeed on a claim for procedural unconscionability based on unfair surprise. These contracts are
prevalent and standardized across the music industry. However, procedural unconscionability may be met via a finding of oppressionwhen the songwriter is unable to negotiate a contract that is a meeting
of the minds. The one-sided terms that favor the publisher, balancing
his losses against his gains at the writer's expense, reach the level of
substantive unconscionability. If the courts continue to review substantive unconscionability based on the outcome of the contract, songwriters such as Jim Croce who receive a benefit from their contract
will not be able to succeed. Courts and the music industry as a whole
need to reject current industry standards that place songwriters in a
"take it or leave it" situation.
5. What to Expect After the Buchwald Cases
What effect did the decision in Buchwald II really have on the
movie industry and is it a harbinger of change in the music publishing
business? Paramount and other studios feared that, once the net profits clause was struck down as unconscionable, the movie industry as
they knew it would no longer survive. 218 However, the net profits language is still present in contracts and continues to be litigated. 219 Following on the tail of Buchwald II was Batfilm Productions, Inc. v.
Warner Bros. Inc. 220 The court reached an opposite finding from that
in Buchwald II, but Batfilm Productions' facts are distinguishable.
Plaintiffs Melniker and Uslan obtained the motion picture rights to
the Batman comic book and made a deal with Warner Bros. that was
similar to Buchwald's deal with Paramount. 221 The distinction is not
within the contracts, but in the power and affluence of the parties.

217. See id. at 14485.
218. See O'DONNELL, supra note 9, at 431.

219. See generally Tim Conners, Note, Beleaguered Accounting: Should the Film
Industry Abandon its Net Profits Formula?,70 CAL. L. REV. 841 (1997) (analyzing the

current net profits formula that is still in use by most major film studios, and stating
that this formula has been the cause of extensive litigation).
220. BIEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 462 (citing Batfilm Prods., Inc. v. Warner
Bros., Inc., Nos. BC051653 & BC051654 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Mar. 14,
1994) (unpublished decision)).
221. See BIEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 462-63; Buchwald II, 90 Daily Journal
D.A.R. at 14487.
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Melniker was the former general counsel of Metro Goldwyn-Mayer
movie studio.222 In the court's opinion he "knew all the tricks of the
trade [and the] inside and out [of] how these contracts work, what
'
they mean, and how they are negotiated."223
The court focused its
analysis on the bargain principle and the idea that a fairness factor
alone will not determine whether a contract is unconscionable.224 In
removing the idea of fairness, the court, in essence, found that if the
terms were lopsided they were still enforceable under the benefit of
the bargain.
Because of Melnicker's knowledge of the various agreements and
how the industry functioned, the court found the contract met the parties' reasonable expectations.225 The procedural unconscionability
analysis used by the court looked at the absence of unfair surprise and
insinuated that the plaintiffs did not suffer from oppressive terms as a
result of Melniker's stature in the film community.226 The Buchwald
II court stressed that the net profits terms were only negotiable for
those parties with clout.227 The Batfllm Productions court is perhaps
implying that Melniker had the clout but chose not to use it in his
negotiations. Further, the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of
pro228
duction regarding allegations of various unconscionable terms.
Melniker is comparable to the plaintiff in Graham v. Scissor-Tail
Inc. 229 to the extent of his knowledge of the industry and implications
of contract terms. The court in Batfilm Productions would not look
past the absence of unfair surprise and review the contract as the
court did in Graham. It is as if Melniker were the wrong plaintiff to
win a net profits case. Subsequent cases challenging the net profits
language have been settled out of court 230 or are currently pending. 231
222. See

BIEDERMAN ET AL.,

supra note 5, at 463 (citing Batfilm Prods., Inc. v.

Warner Bros., Inc., Nos. BC051653 & BC051654 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Mar.
14, 1994) (unpublished decision)).
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 465.
226. See id. at 463-65.
227. See Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14482,
14483 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Dec. 21, 1990) (Phase II) (vacated pursuant to
settlement on appeal).

228. See

BIEDERMAN ET AL.,

supra note 5, at 463 (citing Batfilm Prods., Inc. v.

Warner Bros., Inc. (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Mar. 14, 1994) (unpublished
decision)).
229. 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).

230. See supra notes 156-177 and accompanying text (referring to Buchwald II,
which was settled out of court).
231. See, e.g., Brian Willen, Estate ofJim Garrison v. Warner Bros., THE AMERICAN
LAWYER, Sept. 1996, at 106. The estate of the former New Orleans district attorney
who wrote the book that eventually became the movie JFK, sued Warner Bros. under

a theory of conspiracy to fix the terms of the net profit clauses. See id. The plaintiffs,
who include thousands of actors, directors, producers, and writers that have signed
these agreements in the past, were denied certification as a class for the contract

claims. See id.
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Thus, the decision in Buchwald H did not put the industry out of business as was predicted by Paramount. 3 '
CONCLUSION

By changing industry standards so that unconscionable contractual
terms are no longer accepted, there are really no losers but only winners, whether in the movie industry or the music publishing industry.
The initial benefit to the songwriter will be an increase in payment of
actual royalties due and more clearly defined accounting statements.
The songwriter, even one who is unestablished, will be placed on a
more equal footing with the publisher; in turn, this will further the
bargaining principle. The parties will have actually bargained and the
terms will be reached not solely upon industry norms but by what will
benefit each party. New industry norms allowing for negotiations and
a meeting of the minds will remove the oppressive nature from ESAs.
If these changes are made, the court will not have to be concerned
with uprooting the risk allocation between the parties because it
should be more evenly distributed.
Arguably, publishers, especially small independent publishers, are
always concerned that they will be put out of business if contracts are
not upheld as written. The winners-pay-for-losers argument is probably more convincing for the small publisher, for example, the small
independent movie producer, because independent companies normally survive on shoestring budgets. 33 It would be unfair to all participants in the music industry to conclude that the currently used
standard ESA should continue to be enforced under industry norms
simply because a relatively small number of persons will suffer by
changes.
Although the decision in Buchwald H does not seem to have made
a vast impact to date, based on changes in the English entertainment
' 234
industry after the pronouncements in the "English Music Trilogy,"
it is evident that changes are on the way in the American music industry, even if slow in coming. It has been over twenty years since the

232. See Mathews, supra note 93, at 6.
233. An independent film company is one that is not affiliated with one of the major film companies such as Warner Bros., Paramount, or Universal. See BIEDERMAN
ET AL., supra note 5, at 466. Because independents work on a much smaller scale,
their budgets are normally substantially smaller. See id.
234. See O'Sullivan v. Management Agency & Music Ltd., 3 All E.R. 351 (C.A.
1985); Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. WEA Records Ltd., 1 All E.R. 237 (C.A.
1975); A Schroeder Music Publ'g Co. v. Macaulay, 3 All E.R. 616 (H.L. 1974). See
also discussion, supra Part II.B.
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English court handed down its decision in Macaulay23 as compared to
seven years since the ruling in Buchwald H/.236
Courts are afraid to apply the unconscionability doctrine because
they do not want to disturb the parties' allocation of risks. If the industry as a whole will restructure the agreements, courts should no
longer have to use an unconscionability analysis on these types of
agreements because the goals of this doctrine-alleviating unfairness
of terms and overreaching of parties-will have already been met.
Tamera H. Bennett

235. Macaulay, 3 All E.R. at 616.
236. See Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 90 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14482,
14487 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County, Dec. 21, 1990) (Phase II) (vacated pursuant to
settlement on appeal).
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